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Lee v. Kemna:  
Federal Habeas Corpus and State Procedure
Vicki C. Jackson
Thurgood Marshall Professor of Constitutional Law
M
any of the Supreme Court’s cases involving the federal habeas claims 
of prisoners convicted in state court in the years since the Warren 
Court find that the prisoner’s constitutional challenge cannot be heard on 
the merits for one or more threshold reasons, often of procedure. In aca-
demic debate, some argue that habeas corpus for state-court-convicted pris-
oners “cannot be justified as a case-by-case remedy for individual violations 
of federal constitutional rights.” Lee v. Kemna, 54 U.S. 6 (00), holding 
that a federal habeas petitioner’s constitutional challenge to the basic fairness 
of his trial could and should be heard by the federal district court sitting on 
his federal habeas corpus petition, is a departure from the larger pattern. It 
is restorative of an understanding of federal habeas corpus as a valuable, if 
in some respects “redundant,” check on unconstitutional conduct leading 
to severe deprivations of human liberty; its reasoning is tempered by an ap-
preciation of the importance, and the challenges, of judges exercising sound 
judgment in making and reviewing procedural decisions in criminal cases.
  Charged with having participated in a first-degree murder in Kansas City 
in August 99, at his state court trial Lee sought to present an alibi defense 
that he was in California at the time of the murder. Three members of Lee’s 
family had come from California to testify that he had been visiting with 
them in California during this period. During his trial, which spanned 
only three days, there was considerable discussion of the alibi defense. The 
defendant’s lawyer told the jury during voir dire, and again in his opening 
statement, that they would hear the defendant’s alibi witnesses; an alibi 
charge was discussed by both counsel with the judge. On the third day of 8
trial, the three family members were sequestered in a room at the court-
house first thing in the morning, and they were there at the morning recess. 
However, at the lunch recess they were not there and could not be located.
  Following the brief lunch recess, Lee sought a brief adjournment to 
find his witnesses, who were under subpoena. Out of the presence of the 
jury, Lee testified that he had seen them in the courthouse that morning, 
first thing, and again at the morning recess, that he did not know where 
they were, and that he could not telephone his uncle’s home because it 
had no phone; he also said that he believed the witnesses were in town be-
cause they had come to testify for him and had plans to engage in “some 
ministering” in town that evening. Id. at 69. However, as the Court 
explained, “[t]he trial judge denied the motion, stating that it looked to 
him as though the witnesses had ‘in effect abandoned the defendant’ and 
that, for personal reasons [(his daughter’s hospitalization)], he would ‘not 
be able to be [in court the next day] to try the case.’” Id. at 65-66 (third 
alteration in original). The trial court judge indicated that further delay 
would not be possible, because “he had ‘another case set for trial’ the next 
weekday.” Id. at 66. The trial resumed “without pause,” and without 
the testimony of Lee’s alibi witnesses. Id. Both defense and prosecution 
referred to the absent witnesses in their closings; the jury convicted Lee 
after deliberating three hours, and he was sentenced to life. Id. at 70-7.
  Lee’s motions for a new trial, and his motion for post-conviction relief on 
this issue in the state courts, were denied (the post-conviction court con-
cluding that such trial errors were reviewable only on direct appeal). Id. at 
7. On his consolidated appeals, the Missouri appellate courts refused to 
address the merits of his federal constitutional claim that the court’s failure 
to allow time to find the witnesses deprived him of his constitutional due 
process rights. Id. at 7-7. The state appellate courts relied, not on the 
reasons stated by the trial judge, but on two rules of procedure, requiring 
that motions for continuance be made in writing and that they contain 
representations (e.g., about what the missing witnesses would say and the 
defendant’s diligence in his efforts to procure their testimony), which Lee, 
the appellate court said, had not complied with. Id. at 7-7.9
  The federal district court, to which Lee turned for federal habeas relief 
after exhausting his state court remedies, held that the state court’s judg-
ment rested on an independent and adequate procedural ground barring 
review in habeas corpus. Id. at 74.4 The Eighth Circuit affirmed, in a 
very brief per curiam opinion, finding that Lee had procedurally default-
ed his claim. Lee v. Kemna,  F. d 07 (8th Cir. 000). Chief District 
Judge Mark Bennett, sitting by designation, wrote a substantial dissent. 
Id. at 09-49.
  Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court agreed with Chief Judge Ben-
nett’s dissent that the state court judgment did not rest on an adequate 
state procedural ground. The case was remanded for a merits decision 
on the habeas corpus petition in the federal district court. After review-
ing the alibi witnesses’ testimony in videotaped depositions,	the District 
Judge granted the writ of habeas corpus, vacating the conviction. Lee v. 
Kemna, 004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56 (W.D. Mo. 004) (vacating and 
permanently setting aside the conviction and sentence unless a new trial 
was begun within 90 days). The District Judge (the same judge who had 
previously denied Lee’s habeas corpus petition) concluded, in a reasoned 
opinion, that “a recess was required by due process, on the record as 
articulated, and that petitioner had and has three generally credible wit-
nesses for an alibi defense.”5	Id. at *7.
  Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court in Lee v. Kemna is one I have 
always enjoyed teaching in Federal Courts, for four reasons.
 First,  Lee v. Kemna belies the idea that cases meriting Supreme Court 
review will necessarily arrive with all the “bells and whistles” of a major 
public law dispute. No experienced Supreme Court litigators sought cer-
tiorari here; nor was there an obvious circuit conflict. The Eighth Circuit 
had written a very brief per curiam affirmance of the district court’s dis-
missal of the habeas petition, notwithstanding a long, and strong, dissent 
by a district court judge sitting by designation. And petitioner Lee was 
able to obtain justice at the Supreme Court despite his having to repre-
sent himself at numerous critical stages, including in his petition for cer-
tiorari. (As the Court notes, Lee also had to proceed pro se initially in his 0
state post-conviction proceedings, 54 U.S. at 7, and again in filing his 
petition for habeas corpus relief in the federal district court, id. at 7.) 
The Supreme Court is both “supreme” and a “court.” As a “supreme” 
court, it necessarily cannot sit as a court of errors to correct all mistakes 
of federal law in the lower courts, state and federal; but as a “court,” hear-
ing claims of serious injustice, even in an otherwise “small” case, it can 
appropriately affirm the link between justice and judging.
  Second, the opinion illustrates the importance of the facts and the 
impact of factual circumstances on individual behavior, in litigation (as 
elsewhere). One of the signal features of common-law systems of adjudi-
cation has been a focus on the facts, and this closely reasoned opinion is 
well grounded in the Justice’s evident respect for facts and the record. She 
writes, for example, that the record revealed no support for the trial judge’s 
assumption that the witnesses, who had come from California, had simply 
abandoned the defendant. Id. at 8 (agreeing with the dissenting judge 
in the Eighth Circuit that there was not a “‘scintilla’” of evidence support-
ing that supposition).6 The dissent, by contrast, hypothesized that the 
alibi witnesses may have had “second thoughts” about testifying and pos-
sibly committing perjury, in light, inter alia, of the prosecution’s evidence; 
the dissent also suggested that defense counsel had perhaps decided to 
abandon the alibi defense, fearing its collapse. Id. at 40-0 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). Justice Ginsburg rebutted both arguments from further con-
sideration of the record and the “realities of trial.” Id. at 8 n.. When 
these three witnesses were finally heard by a judge (two years after the Su-
preme Court’s decision), that federal district judge—who had previously 
denied relief—concluded that the witnesses were “very credible.”7 Given 
the finding of the witnesses’ general credibility (and their willingness to 
testify by deposition in the habeas proceedings that followed the Supreme 
Court’s decision), Justice Ginsburg’s reading of the factual record appears 
to be more accurate as to the facts accounting for the witnesses’ disap-
pearance. In opinions across areas including gender equality, race equality, 
and reproductive freedom, Justice Ginsburg’s attention to the facts is a 
welcome font of common-law judicial sensibility.
  Third, the opinion reflects a willingness to empower appellate judg-
es to identify “exceptional” cases involving “exorbitant application” of 
rules, and to make the judgments such a standard requires. The Court 
explained that there are “exceptional cases in which exorbitant applica-
tion of a generally sound rule renders the state ground inadequate to stop 
consideration of a federal question” and concluded that this was such an 
exceptional case. Id. at 76. In a sense, this standard is one that involves 
trusting judges to decide when literal compliance with written rules 
should not bar consideration of claims. While it may seem strange to 
talk about trusting judges (given that the trial judge’s ruling was found to 
be in error), the Court’s decision is, in a sense, brave enough to trust the 
appellate process to recognize truly “exorbitant” applications of otherwise 
sensible rules. Such a willingness to allow recognition of “exorbitant” or 
grossly undue application of valid rules runs against the grain of a formal-
ism that, as Justice Frankfurter put it in his Staub dissent, favors enforc-
ing rules even when “the reason for the rule does not clearly apply.” Staub 
v. City of Baxley, 55 U.S. ,  (958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). And, 
it ventures beyond the apparent protection that formalist adherence to 
rules offers those who are judges, by insisting that some further element 
of judgment may be called for. Application of such a standard plainly 
depends on trust in the judgment of other judges. A standard that in-
volves trusting judges to distinguish exorbitant from other applications 
of legitimate rules may be understood as expressing a commitment to 
the justice-seeking role of being a judge. But, if not wisely used, it might 
pose a potential threat to the orderly application of procedural rules to 
produce legitimately stable decisions; condemning an exorbitant appli-
cation of a procedural rule in one case might lead to condemning a less 
exorbitant application in another (by following a broadly stated principle 
attributed to the first case). This brings me to my last point.
  This opinion indicates that constitutional values of procedural justice 
can be vindicated without threat to state procedural systems. The deci-
sion in Henry v. Mississippi, 79 U.S. 44 (965), concerned some judges 
and scholars, insofar as they believed it opened the door (on direct federal 
review) to second-guessing of the need to apply legitimate rules of pro-
cedure in the state courts. Lee v. Kemna, however, is carefully cabined, 
repeatedly emphasizing its own limitations.8 The Court did not simply 
say this at a general level, but gave three reasons that “in combination” 
explained why the case was special and the state court application of pro-
cedural rules “exorbitant”: The reasons given by the trial judge could not 
have been affected by perfect compliance with the procedural rules; the 
Missouri rules had never been applied in a case as unusual as this, where 
subpoenaed witnesses, who had been present in the courthouse the very 
day of their planned testimony, mysteriously disappeared (on the last 
day of trial); and finally, “given ‘the realities of trial,’ … Lee substantially 
complied with Missouri’s key Rule,” by virtue of Lee’s testimony that day 
and the information about the alibi witnesses repeatedly presented to the 
court over the three days of the proceedings. Id. at 8-85. An ultimately 
successful due process claim, never heard by the state appellate courts, 
nor the federal habeas court prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, was 
thus allowed to be heard and federal constitutional rights vindicated in 
the federal habeas corpus proceeding after the Supreme Court’s decision.
  Would it have been better had the state appeals courts heard the federal 
constitutional question in the first instance? Undoubtedly so. But this 
opinion invites the state court system to continue to develop and enforce 
procedural rules to assure the orderly conduct of trials, and trusts them—
appellate as well as trial judges—to apply those rules with sensitivity to 
the possibility that on rare occasions an application will be so exorbitant 
that adherence to the procedural values of our constitutional justice sys-
tem should allow adjudication on the merits. It invites state court judges, 
too, to share in the responsibility of judgment, to avoid such exorbitant 
applications in the future.
 In  004, David Shapiro wrote that Lee v. Kemna, like others of Justice 
Ginsburg’s decisions, “evince[s] a pragmatism emphasizing the particular 
context and focusing on what works best in that context in the interests 
of both judicial efficiency and fairness to litigants.”9 Professor Shapiro 
described Lee v. Kemna as one of his “favorites.” Mine too.
m
Endnotes
    With thanks to Richard Fallon and Judith Resnik for very helpful 
comments, and to Molly Jennings for able research assistance. Any 
errors are, of course, my own.
    Joseph L. Hoffman & Nancy J. King, Right Problem, Wrong Solution, 
 Cal. L. Rev. Circuit 49, 50 (00).
    During his opening statement to the jury, “defense counsel said three 
close family members would testify that Lee came to visit them in Ven-
tura, California, in July 99 and stayed through the end of October. 
Lee’s mother and stepfather would say they picked him up from the 
airport at the start of his visit and returned him there at the end. Lee’s 
sister would testify that Lee resided with her and her four children 
during this time. All three would affirm that they saw Lee regularly 
throughout his unbroken sojourn.” Lee v. Kemna, 54 U.S. at 67-68.
  4  The district court also held at that time that affidavits from the three 
witnesses could not be considered because they had not been offered 
to the state courts. Id. at 374.
  5  See Lee v. Kemna, 004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56, at * (“Unlike some 
cases involving family witnesses, the three in this case testify in a very 
credible manner, and I doubt that a jury would view them as will-
ful perjurers.”). The District Court also felt there were weaknesses 
and deficiencies in their testimony but that the jury could have been 
persuaded that Lee was in California at the time of the murder. Id. at 
*, *5. See also id. at * (stating that the witnesses’ depositions had 
been taken).
  6 See 54 U.S. at 7 n.6 (noting that all three witnesses had previously 
indicated, in essence, that a court officer had informed them, mid-
day, that their testimony would not be needed until the next day).  
  7  See above at note 5. To be sure, there remains a mystery about who 
told the court official to tell the family that they could leave. The 
district court judge found no evidence that the prosecution had 
done so, but engaged in what he called “speculation” about wheth-
er defense counsel himself (at odds with the defendant and acting 
“disingenuous[ly]”) may have done so. Lee v. Kemna, 004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 56, at *5-6 & n.8.4
  8  Whatever else might be said, it would be difficult to argue that the 
state court’s application, in Henry, of the “contemporaneous objec-
tion” rule was “exorbitant,” and the majority in Henry did not so 
argue. See 79 U.S. at 449 (indicating that where “enforcement of the 
[state procedural] rule … would serve no substantial state interest,” 
it would not bar review of the federal claim).
  9  David L. Shapiro, Justice Ginsburg’s First Decade: Some Thoughts 
About Her Contributions in the Fields of Procedure And Jurisdiction, 
04 Colum. L. Rev. , 6 (004).